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A Catenaccio Game: the 2010 election in Scotland 
 
James Mitchell and Arno Van Der Zwet 
 
 
 
At the Scottish Conservative conference following the 1979 general election, 
Margaret Thatcher thanked the party for its contribution to victory.  The Scottish 
Conservatives had won 31 per cent of the vote, up almost 7% on the previous election.  
With 22 of Scotland’s 71 seats, Mrs Thatcher commended the six new Tory MPs who 
had gained a seat for the party.  But the new Prime Minister was conscious that her party 
had a long way to go to achieve the level of support it had won in England, ‘Is it that our 
policies are not so popular in Scotland? Of course not,’ she asserted.1  Being in 
government afforded the Conservatives with the opportunity to pursue popular policies 
that might allow them to close the gap between their support in Scotland and England. 
However, fourteen years later in her memoirs, Mrs Thatcher reflected that there 
had been ‘no Tartan Thatcherite revolution... The balance sheet of Thatcherism in 
Scotland is a lopsided one: economically positive but politically negative’.2  Over the 
eighteen years in power, the Conservatives lost support in Scotland and ultimately lost all 
seats north of the border in 1997.  The Conservative brand in Scotland had been seriously 
tarnished.  Being in government had created more problems than opportunities.  
Whatever they did would be presented by opponents as anti-Scottish simply because the 
Conservatives had so little support in Scotland.  Mrs Thatcher’s style did not help.  There 
is evidence that many Tory policies were popular in Scotland, most notably council house 
sales, but paid no electoral dividends. 
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The diagnosis of Conservative unpopularity in Scotland after 1979 was similar to 
that offered by a number of senior Tories for the Conservatives’ defeat across Britain in 
1997.  The brand, rather than its policies, was the cause of its problems.  In his speech to 
the Tory conference in 2005, Francis Maude noted that popular policies lost their appeal 
as soon as they were associated with the Conservative Party.  In his booklet, Smell the 
Coffee: A Wake-Up Call for the Conservative Party, Michael Ashcroft argued that the 
‘Conservative label was undermining its ability to sell its policies’ and that many voters 
‘had such a negative view of the Conservative Party’s brand that they would oppose a 
policy they actually agreed with rather than support a Tory proposal’.3  David Cameron’s 
challenge as leader was to detoxify the brand.  He was aided in this in that the main 
competition’s brand was also damaged.  In under five years, Cameron reached parts of 
the UK none of his predecessors since John Major had done. 
However, the much vaunted ‘Cameron effect’ had no impact on Scotland.  The 
Tories’ brand problem ran deep north of the border.  Annabel Goldie, the party’s 
Holyrood leader, is popular, but has been unable to overcome the deep-rooted 
unpopularity of her party in Scotland.  This problem goes further back than the 
difficulties Cameron confronted with his detoxification strategy across Britain.  Over the 
thirteen years in Opposition, focus was on winning back support lost in 1997, neglecting 
the longer-term loss of support in Scotland.  Back in government, the Conservatives’ 
Scottish problems have become exposed once more.  Whether being in government offers 
the Conservatives more opportunities than problems will be conditioned in part by the 
economic and fiscal context.  The existence of a Scottish Parliament adds to the mix and 
might either become a means through which the Government is able to devolve penury, 
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evading many difficult choices itself or becomes an authoritative voice of opposition to 
London government.  With only one Scottish MP, coalition with the Liberal Democrats, 
with eleven MPs in Scotland, ensures that on this occasion opposition to the 
Conservatives will at least be more limited. 
 
A Scottish result 
Despite a very British campaign, the outcome of the election in Scotland was 
quite different from that elsewhere in Britain.  No seats changed hands in Scotland (see 
Table 1).4  Labour retained all 40 seats won in 2005, including winning back two seats 
lost in by-elections during the last Parliament.  The Scottish Conservative Party held onto 
its solitary Scottish seat, but failed to win any of its eleven target seats.5  While Labour’s 
vote fell by 6.5% in Wales and by 7.4% in England it rose by 3.1% in Scotland, the first 
increase in Labour support in Scotland since its landslide in 1997.  By contrast, the 
Conservatives increased their share of the vote by 4.7% in Wales, 3.8% in England and 
only 0.9% in Scotland.  The Scottish National Party (SNP) vote was up 2.3%, although it 
failed to win any additional seats and fell well short of its target of 20 additional seats to 
make Westminster ‘dance to a Scottish jig’.6  The Liberal Democrats’ vote fell by 3.7% 
and dropped behind the SNP to third place in share of the vote while in England the 
Liberal Democrat vote was up by 1.3%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
1: The 2010 election results in Scotland 
 Seats won (change since 
2005) 
% share of vote (change 
since 2005) 
Labour 41 (+1*) 42.0 (+3.1) 
SNP 6 (0) 19.9 (+2.3) 
LibDem 11 (0) 18.9 (-3.7) 
Conservative 1 (0) 16.7 (+0.9) 
Others 0 (-1*) 2.4 (-2.6) 
* Speaker’s seat 
 
 
No party has governed Scotland with such a low share of the vote and only one 
seat.  Coalition rather than minority government may have been David Cameron’s 
preference but it looks more like a necessity from a Scottish perspective, offering cover 
for its poor performance north of the border.  But even the combined Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat share of the vote was 3.9% below that won by the Conservatives in 
England and 3.2% below Labour’s Scottish support.  The coalition’s twelve Scottish MPs 
represent predominantly Highland and rural constituencies and East Dumbartonshire is 
the only seat held by the parties in west central Scotland where the bulk of the population 
resides.  The Liberal Democrats do not offer the Conservatives much Scottish cover. 
While the SNP replaced the Liberal Democrats as Scotland’s second party in 
share of the vote, it remained firmly in third place in number of seats and failed to come 
close to challenging Labour’s dominance of Westminster elections north of the border.  
The SNP’s breakthrough three years before in elections to the Scottish Parliament had 
convinced many in the SNP that it could make a similar breakthrough at Westminster.  
But the SNP failed to take account of the electorate’s willingness to behave differently at 
Westminster and Holyrood elections.  Even in the heat of the election, the electorate’s 
preferences continued to distinguish between Westminster and Holyrood elections.  
 5
While Labour and SNP compete as largest part at Holyrood, Labour remains dominant at 
Westminster. 
Though no seats changed hands, 15 new MPs were returned from Scotland, of 
whom 13 were Labour members.  Alex Salmond was replaced as SNP MP for Banff and 
Buchan by Eilidh Whiteford and Mike Crockart replaced his Liberal Democrat 
colleagues John Barrett as MP for Edinburgh West.  The number of women MPs rose 
from nine (7%) in 2005 to 13 (13.2 per cent) in 2010, including the youngest MP at 25 
years of age.  Mohammad Sarwar, Scotland’s only Muslim and ethnic minority MP, was 
replaced by his son in Glasgow Central.  While Alex Salmond stood down after 23 years 
as an MP, two Labour Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) became dual members 
on election to the House of Commons and two Conservative MSPs stood unsuccessfully.  
With the elevation of former Labour First Minister Jack McConnell to the House of 
Lords, there are now two members of the Lords who are also MSPs (both Labour). 
 
A very British election 
The 2010 election was a very British affair.  There has always been a Scottish 
dimension to UK general elections.  Since 1959, the three main British parties have each 
produced Scottish manifestos, though these were often little more than the British 
manifestos with Scottish covers.  The Scottish dimension manifested itself in debates on 
Scotland’s constitutional status in elections up to 1997.   However, there have been other 
distinguishing features of elections in Scotland, not the least of which have been the 
results.  In 1979, when the Conservatives last returned to power following a period of 
Labour Government, the election in Scotland saw the ‘temporary eclipse of the Scottish 
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dimension’.7  The 2010 election also appeared to be a very British election in which the 
Scottish dimension was eclipsed though the result bucked the British trend. 
 Three aspects of the campaign signified its Britishness: the British leaders’ 
debates; the public policy debate with particular emphasis on the economy and public 
finances; and the relative absence of much debate on Scotland’s constitutional status.  
The focus on the British leaders’ debates had the effect of marginalising any distinctive 
Scottish dimension.  Styled by the BBC as ‘Prime Ministerial Debates’, the rules for the 
debates had been agreed between the three main parties and excluded the leaders of the 
smaller parties, including the SNP.  The Prime Ministerial debates not only gave the 
impression that broadcasters had re-written the constitution as a Presidential system, but a 
formula was required to deal with issues that were devolved.   
Broadcasters had three responses in dealing with devolved issues.  First, in 
hosting the three debates in England (Manchester, Bristol and Birmingham) the 
broadcasters side-stepped the difficulties of accommodating matters that were devolved 
by simply focusing on the election as it affected England.  Secondly, each time a matter 
was raised that was devolved to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, the debate 
moderator noted that the subject was devolved.  Alastair Stewart, ITV moderator in the 
first debate, prefaced a question on law and order, for example, by simply stating that ‘I 
need to point out that it is an area where powers are devolved to the parliament in 
Scotland and from this week, also the assembly in Northern Ireland’.8  This was to be the 
standard operating procedure during debates for dealing with the broadcasters’ equivalent 
of the West Lothian Question.  None of the party leaders felt compelled to engage with 
the implications of Britain’s territorial constitution during the debates.  References to 
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Scotland were almost non-existent.  In answer to what he had done personally to tackle 
climate change, Gordon Brown mentioned the solar panel installed at his North 
Queensferry home in Scotland.  Nick Clegg’s nearest comment on Scotland was a 
reference to MPs who had ‘flipped’ properties getting away ‘scot-free’.  Scotland, 
Scottish and Scots never passed the lips of David Cameron in any of the debates.  
Thirdly, the broadcasters offered separate Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland debates 
at other times.  In essence, the broadcasters’ response to their own West Lothian Question 
has been much like successive UK Governments until now and to ignore it. 
The Prime Ministerial debates attracted considerable public interest beyond 
England.  The first debate attracted high viewing figures across Britain and while there 
was a lower proportion of viewers in Scotland, the figures watching the three British 
party leaders’ debates were much higher than any of the Scottish leaders’ debates.  In 
addition, there was the usual coverage of the election that tended to marginalise the 
Scottish dimension and smaller parties, including interviews with the three British party 
leaders.  The SNP objected and took their case to the Court of Session in Edinburgh in an 
attempt to stop the third (BBC) debate being broadcast in Scotland but failed to win its 
case.9  The judge argued that impartiality was not the same as ‘giving each and every 
political party equal coverage’ and that the SNP had failed to demonstrate that the BBC 
had failed to take account of impartiality.  She also noted that the SNP had failed to act 
earlier but had waited until the final debate before issuing it legal challenge and had 
failed to explain adequately what fairness entailed.10 
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 2: Viewing figures for ‘Prime Ministerial’ debates and UK leader interviews: 
Scotland and the UK compared 
Channel Date Start 
time 
UK 
Network 
000s* 
Network 
TVR 
%** 
Share 
%*** 
Scotland 
000s 
Scotland 
TVR % 
Scotland
Share 
% 
ITV1 15/4/10 20:32 9679 17 36 699 15 33 
BBC News 
 
Sky News 
22/4/10 20:00 
 
20:00 
1388 
 
2212 
2 
 
4 
5 
 
9 
70 
 
148 
2 
 
3 
3 
 
7 
BBC1 29/4/10 20:30 7428 13 27 419 9 19 
Programme Date Start 
time 
Network 
000s* 
Network 
TVR** 
Share*** Scotland 
000s 
Scotland 
TVR 
Share 
BBC1 
Paxman 
interviews 
Clegg 
12/4/10 20:30 2170 3.81 5 70 2 3 
BBC1 
Paxman 
interviews 
Cameron 
23/4/10 20:30 2336 4.1 10.18 180 3.97 9.52 
BBC1 
Paxman 
interviews 
Brown 
30/4/10 20:30 2574 4.52 11.19 194 4.28 11.07 
*This is average audience across the programme 
** This is the % of UK/Scotland population watching the debate – e.g. 17 TVR means 17% of UK population 
watched the first debate while it was 15% in Scotland. 
*** This gives viewing share of all people watching television at the time of the debate e.g. 36% of those 
watching television tuned into the first debate. 
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3: Viewing figures for Scottish party leaders debates 
Debate Channel Date Start time 000s TVR % Share % 
Scottish 
Debates 
ITV 22/4/10 21:00 251 6 13 
Scottish 
Leaders’ 
Debate 
BBC1 2/5/10 21:58 199 4 9 
SKY 
News 
Scotland 
Debate 
Sky 25/4/10 10.30 59 1.28  
 
 
  
Part of the SNP’s case had been that the ‘impact of the previous two debates on 
the media coverage of the General Election campaign as a whole, has been demonstrably 
the single largest factor in the current UK General Election campaign in terms of impact 
on the media profile, approval ratings of party leaders and overall intention to vote’ and 
that the inclusion of Nick Clegg in the previous two debates ‘greatly increased the 
coverage of that party in the media’ and ‘greatly improved the fortunes of that party in 
the opinion polls’.11  Polls had indicated a ‘Clegg bounce’ following the first debate, 
though Scottish polls suggested that the Liberal Democrats only managed to climb back 
to the level of support won in 2005 (although up on how they had been doing prior to the 
debate).  Evidence from a YouGov poll conducted before and after the first debate 
suggests that Liberal Democrat support jumped from 17 to 23% in Scotland and from 21 
to 24% after the third poll.  The Liberal Democrats appeared to be fighting it out for third 
place with the Conservatives in Scotland at the start of the campaign in Scotland with 
Labour pulling well ahead of the SNP in second place.  The first debate gave the Liberal 
Democrats a boost, drawing ahead of the SNP and for much of the remainder of the 
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campaign appeared likely to retain their position, won in 2005, as Scotland’s second 
party at Westminster. 
 
 
Table 4: Scottish opinion polls (% vote share) 
    Labour SNP LibDem Cons 
2005 Election Result    39.5 17.6 22.6 15.8 
PUBLICATION Polling 
Firm 
Sample 
dates 
Sample 
size 
    
Scottish Daily Mail YouGov 24-26/8/09 1,078 33 25 16 19 
Scottish Mail on 
Sunday 
YouGov 26-28 Aug 
09 
1,183 30 26 18 20 
Herald TNS-
BMRB 
28 Oct – 3 
Nov 09 
983 39 25 12 18 
Telegraph YouGov 18 Nov – 
20 Nov 09 
 
1,141 39 24 12 18 
Sunday Times Ipsos 
MORI 
19 Nov- 23 
Nov 09 
1,009 32 34 12 15 
Herald TNS-
BMRB 
27 Jan – 4 
Feb 2010 
1000 42 26 11 18 
Sun YouGov 15-17 Feb 
2010 
562 34 24 15 21 
Sun YouGov 17-24 Feb 
2010 
667 40 23 14 18 
Scotsman YouGov 24-26 Feb 
2010  
1002 35 24 15 20 
Scotland on Sunday YouGov 24-26 Feb 
2010 
1002 38 21 15 20 
Times Ipsos 
MORI 
18/2-
21/2/10 
1,006 34 32 12 17 
Sun YouGov 24/2-3/3/10 821 39 24 14 18 
Sun YouGov 3-10/3/10 720 39 26 12 18 
Sun YouGov 10-17 
March 2010
781 39 24 15 16 
Sun YouGov 17-24 
March 2010
885 36 23 13 21 
Sun YouGov 24-31 
March 2010
936 39 23 15 21 
PoliticsHome YouGov 4-11 April 
2010 
1227 38 24 16 17 
Scotsman YouGov 14-16 April 
2010 
 40 20 19 16 
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The dominance of the economy and public finances may have had distinctly 
Scottish dimensions but these did not feature in the main debates.  While the Scottish 
implications of the economic crisis and impact on Holyrood’s finances were part of the 
debate in Scotland, the UK-wide dimension dominated as the economy and decisions on 
how much money Holyrood would have to spend are matters retained at Westminster.  
The Scottish dimension appeared to have been marginalised both by the focus on the 
Prime Ministerial debates but also the policy concerns. 
 
Even though many of the issues debated in UK elections have been the 
responsibility of the Scottish Parliament since its establishment in 1999, there was little 
effort to distinguish between matters that were devolved or retained.  Indeed, it would 
have been difficult to mount a British-wide campaign without surrounding many 
Politics Home YouGov 11-18 April 
2010 
1,227 39 20 20 17 
STV Ipsos 
MORI 
14-17 April 
2010 
1,005 36 26 20 14 
Sun YouGov 14-21 April 
2010 
1,329 36 21 23 15 
Sky YouGov 21-23 April 
2010 
1,001 36 22 24 15 
PoliticsHome YouGov 18-25 April 
2010 
1,227 36 21 25 14 
Times Populus 23-26 April 
2010 
1,000 37 19 24 16 
Sun YouGov 1,121 1,227 36 23 23 14 
Scotland on Sunday YouGov 1,520  37 20 22 17 
PoliticsHome YouGov   37 25 22 14 
Scottish Mail on 
Sunday 
TNS 
BMRB 
21-27 April 
2010 
1,029 44 23 16 13 
Scotsman YouGov 3-5 May 
2010 
1,507 37 21 22 17 
2010 Election Result    41.9 19.9 18.8 16.4 
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commitments with devolution caveats.  What was significant was that the Scottish 
manifestos and campaigns largely ignored the fact that MPs would have no direct say in 
devolved matters.  Policies appeared in the Scottish manifestos which would have been 
more appropriate in manifestos for next year’s Holyrood elections.  Scottish Labour’s 
manifesto, for example, stated, ‘...our goal is educational excellence for every child’ and 
describes Labour’s ‘ambitious programme of school building’ from its period in 
government in Scotland from 1999-2007.12  Devolved matters were the subject of debates 
as if these were Holyrood elections.  In essence, Holyrood and devolved matters were 
subsumed within this UK election.  There was little effort on the part of the parties or 
media to attribute responsibility to reflect constitutional realities. 
Scotland’s constitutional status hardly registered in the election despite the SNP 
Government’s ‘National Conversation’, a Scottish Government-sponsored debate, on the 
subject.  The SNP Government had proposed a referendum on independence, but lacks a 
Parliamentary majority at Holyrood.  The opposition parties at Holyrood – Labour, 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats - had established a Commission under Sir Kenneth 
Calman to review devolution.  It reported in June 2009 recommending minor changes in 
devolved powers and changes in how Holyrood would be financed.  None of the SNP’s 
opponents were keen to discuss the subject during the election and there was the 
appearance of cross-Unionist consensus around the proposals of the Calman 
Commission.13  Calman had been set up in response to the SNP’s electoral success at the 
Holyrood elections and its success was evident in removing Scotland’s constitutional 
status from the political agenda.  This left the SNP alone in struggling to raise the 
constitutional question. 
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The most pressing issues in Scotland as elsewhere during the election focused on 
the economy and public finances, crowding out discussion of Scotland’s constitutional 
status.  Although there was a Scottish dimension, the key issue of when spending cuts 
would occur dominated debates.  There was less debate on which services would be cut, 
given a fair degree of consensus across the three British parties, thereby making the 
question of where the cuts would be imposed, both in terms of services and territories, 
less controversial than might otherwise have been the case. 
 
Leaders and leadership 
 There was even more focus on the party leaders in this election than in the past.  
However, this was complicated in Scotland, where Alex Salmond, the SNP’s leader, is 
First Minister of the Scottish Government and was standing down as an MP.  Angus 
Robertson, leader of the SNP group at Westminster is hardly a household name in 
Scotland.  A further complication was that Gordon Brown is a Scot and Scottish MP.  
Given that the Conservatives have suffered from an image as an anti-Scottish or at least 
English party, David Cameron’s leadership might have been seen by many Scots as 
epitomising an upper class Englishman.  Nick Clegg might also have been expected to 
suffer from a similar image problem north of the border given his background, not least 
compared to Charles Kennedy who had led the Liberal Democrats in 2005.  However, 
polls suggest that Cameron and Clegg were more popular than `their respective parties in 
Scotland, a situation that had also occurred when John Major had led the Conservatives. 
Polls suggest that there was little evidence of a ‘Cameron bounce’ since his 
election as Conservative leader in December 2005 though considerable evidence of a 
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Clegg effect after the first Prime Ministerial debate and a persistent positive Brown effect 
in Scotland.  In February 2010, Clegg’s ratings were low compared to other party leaders 
though this was probably due to his low profile.  The Prime Ministerial debates gave him 
a platform that raised his profile and ensured that his personal ratings soared (see Table 
5) but it had far less impact on his party’s support.  As we saw earlier, Scottish Liberal 
Democrat support at the time of the third Prime Ministerial debate (29 April) was only 
around the same level that the party had won in 2005.  There was also evidence that Alex 
Salmond polled well but again this appears to have had little impact.  In this case, the 
electorate may have decided that 2010 was not the year in which their judgment of the 
First Minister was relevant.  Though David Cameron’s poll ratings improved during the 
election in Scotland, his net ratings remained negative.  Gordon Brown’s ratings proved 
the mirror of Cameron’s in Scotland but also mirrored his ratings in England.  While a 
poll taken at the end of April showed Brown to have a net positive rating of 7 points, his 
ratings across Britain in a poll conducted around the same time showed a net negative 
rating of 19 points.  Labour in Scotland was keen to make much of Gordon Brown’s 
Scottish roots.  As Douglas Alexander said during the campaign, ‘I think people are 
proud of having a Scottish Prime Minister who knows where he is from and where he 
wants to take the country’.14  This was a view given prominence in Labour supporting 
media north of the border where there was often a backlash against harsh criticism of the 
Prime Minister from other media outlets. 
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5: Leaders’ ratings in Scotland 
Leader Total Good Total bad Date Sample Polling Firm 
Gordon 
Brown 
43 35 24-26th Feb 1002 YouGov 
Alex 
Salmond 
36 38 
David 
Cameron 
28 33 
Nick Clegg 26 23 
 
Gordon 
Brown 
45 38 28 -30 April 
(last election 
debate) 
1628 YouGov 
Alex 
Salmond 
39 34 
David 
Cameron 
32 35 
Nick Clegg 55 14 
 
 
 
Change under the surface 
The extent of Labour’s success in 2010 was evident in its ability to hold onto or 
increase its share of the vote across Scotland.  Labour’s share of the vote fell in only five 
Labour-held constituencies compared with 2005:  Livingston, where Jim Devine, the 
former Labour MP had been charged with expenses related crimes; Aberdeen South, a 
Liberal Democrat target seat; Dunfermline and West Fife, won by the Liberal Democrats 
at a by-election in 2006; Falkirk, where former Labour MP came out in support of the 
SNP candidate; and Airdrie and Shotts, where former Home Secretary John Reid was 
standing down and there had been controversy surrounding proposals for an all-women 
short-list of Labour candidates.  However, Labour’s vote held up well in seats that might 
have been expected to record a significant swing against the party including many 
marginal seats.  New candidates replaced incumbents likely to damage Labour due to 
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embarrassing expenses claims, personal issues and peccadilloes and staved off swings 
against the party.   
 
Though no seats changed hands, other changes are discernible.  As the Liberal 
Democrats slipped back, their position as second party in share of the vote across 
Scotland was lost to the SNP, while they held onto second place in number of seats.  The 
SNP moved into second place in ten more seats while Labour and the Conservatives 
moved into second place in one more seat each.  These movements were all achieved at 
the expense of the Liberal Democrats except in Edinburgh West, held by the Liberal 
Democrats, where Labour moved ahead of the Conservatives to become second party.  In 
only two of these seats – Edinburgh West and Gordon – is the new second party within 
less than 10% of the winning party, so that these changes are unlikely to affect who wins 
at the next election.  The SNP has moved into second place in 29 constituencies and its 
share of the vote rose in 46 of Scotland’s 59 constituencies, but it remains well behind 
Labour and still has a long way to go to have a chance of gaining seats.  The 
Conservatives are in second place in 15 seats with Labour in second in nine and Liberal 
Democrats in only six. 
While the SNP may have become the second party, its best hope of gaining an 
additional seat is Scotland’s twelfth most marginal seat and would require a swing of 
5.1%, even larger than was required after 2005.  The Liberal Democrats are in second 
place in the two most marginal seats in Scotland, both in Edinburgh, but Labour is in 
second in the next two most marginal seats.  The picture that emerges is that Labour 
retains its pre-eminent position while the other three parties fight it out to become 
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challenger.  Labour not only holds 41 seats but does so comfortably.  It would take a 
uniform swing of 10.8% and the loss of former Scottish Secretary Jim Murphy’s 
Renfrewshire East seat before Labour lost its overall majority of seats in Scotland.  The 
SNP would require a uniform swing of almost 10% to get into double figures in number 
of MPs and a uniform swing of just under 20% to reach the additional 20, the objective 
Alex Salmond set his party before 2005.  The Conservatives would require a swing 
slightly less than this to get into double figures.  Labour’s continued dominance of 
Westminster elections in Scotland looks as assured as can be imagined. 
 
 
 
6: Constituencies by marginality 
Rank 2005 
Rank 
2010  Constituency 
Winning 
Party 
second 
place 2005 
Swin
g 
2005 
second 
Place 2010  Swing  2010 
1 1 Edinburgh South Lab Lib 0.47 Lib 0.36 
2 3 Dundee East SNP Lab 0.48 Lab 2.245 
3 12 
Ochil and South 
Perthshire Lab SNP 0.74 SNP 5.14
4 6 Aberdeen South Lab Lib 1.62 Lib 4.07 
5 10 Perth and North Perthshire SNP Con 1.66 Con 4.535 
6 11 
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale 
and Tweeddale  Con Lab 1.95 Lab 4.57 
7 9 Angus SNP Con 2.10 Con 4.325 
8 2 
Edinburgh North and 
Leith Lab Lib 2.52 Lib 1.82 
9 20 Dumfries and Galloway  Lab Con 2.87 Con 7.135 
10 4 Dunbartonshire East Lib Lab 4.35 Lab 2.28 
11 25 
Inverness, Nairn, 
Badenoch and Strathspey Lib Lab 4.69 Lab 9.31
12 16 Na h-Eileanan an Iar SNP Lab 5.21 Lab 6.405 
13 23 Stirling Lab Con 5.46 Con 8.93 
14 17 Glasgow North Lab Lib 5.98 Lib 6.58 
15 15 
Berwickshire, Roxburgh 
and Selkirk Lib Con 6.50 Con 5.785 
16 5 Argyll and Bute Lib Con 6.52 Con 3.79 
17 27 Renfrewshire East Lab Con 7.02 Con 10.175 
18 26 Dundee West Lab SNP 7.28 SNP 9.805 
19 18 Moray SNP Con 7.32 Con 6.82 
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20 33 Edinburgh East Lab Lib 7.81 SNP 11.515 
21 24 Edinburgh South West Lab Con 8.24 Con 9.29 
22 35 East Lothian Lab Lib 8.32 Con 12.47 
23 7 
Aberdeenshire West and 
Kincardine Lib Con 8.97 Con 4.08 
24 30 Aberdeen North Lab Lib 9.27 SNP 11.09 
25 36 Midlothian Lab Lib 9.63 SNP 13.185 
26 37 Kilmarnock and Loudoun Lab SNP 9.80 SNP 13.295 
27 29 
Ayr, Carrick and 
Cumnock Lab Con 11.10 Con 10.8 
28 34 
Linlithgow and East 
Falkirk Lab SNP 12.07 SNP 12.2 
29 38 Ayrshire Central Lab Con 12.16 Con 13.675 
30 19 Gordon Lib Lab 12.41 SNP 6.915 
31 28 Ayrshire North and Arran Lab Con 12.78 SNP 10.725 
32 45 
Paisley and Renfrewshire 
North Lab SNP 13.45 SNP 17.48 
33 14 
Dunfermline and West 
Fife Lab Lib 13.64 Lib 5.585 
34 40 Lanark and Hamilton East Lab Lib 13.70 SNP 14.475 
35 41 Glasgow South Lab Lib 14.09 SNP 15.785 
36 50 Glenrothes Lab SNP 14.27 SNP 20.305 
37 21 Falkirk Lab SNP 14.73 SNP 7.72 
38 22 
Caithness, Sutherland and 
Easter Ross Lib Lab 14.76 Lab 8.39 
39 31 Livingston Lab SNP 14.77 SNP 11.265 
40 42 
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and 
Kirkintilloch East Lab SNP 14.79 SNP 16.715 
41 48 Glasgow North West Lab Lib 14.82 Lib 19.125 
42 8 Edinburgh West Lib Con 15.02 Lab 4.095 
43 51 Dunbartonshire West Lab SNP 15.09 SNP 20.595 
44 43 Glasgow Central Lab Lib 15.21 SNP 17.25 
45 39 
East Kilbride, Strathaven 
and Lesmahagow  Lab SNP 15.42 SNP 14.235 
46 49 Inverclyde Lab SNP 15.60 SNP 19.235 
47 13 Banff and Buchan SNP Con 15.90 Con 5.235 
48 32 Fife North East Lib Con 16.30 Con 11.295 
49 52 
Paisley and Renfrewshire 
South Lab Lib 17.47 SNP 20.77 
50 59 Glasgow North East Lab SNP 17.83 SNP 27.105 
51 54 
Rutherglen and Hamilton 
West Lab Lib 18.62 SNP 22.35 
52 58 Orkney and Shetland Lib Lab 18.68 Lab 25.66 
53 53 Motherwell and Wishaw Lab SNP 20.51 SNP 21.475 
54 44 Airdrie and Shotts Lab SNP 21.24 SNP 17.305 
55 57 
Kirkcaldy and 
Cowdenbeath Lab SNP 21.79 SNP 25.12 
56 46 Glasgow East Lab SNP 21.83 SNP 18.405 
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57 47 Ross, Skye and Lochaber Lib Lab 21.90 Lab 18.76 
58 55 Glasgow South West Lab SNP 22.43 SNP 23.08 
59 56 
Coatbridge, Chryston and 
Bellshill Lab SNP 25.45 SNP 24.875 
 
A Catenaccio game 
 The 2010 election in Scotland appears to have been a defensive Catenaccio game 
though that may only be a retrospective impression rather than a strategy adopted by all 
or any party.  At the Scotland-wide level, Labour was able to easily hold its own, but this 
also applied at individual constituency level.  At the outset of the campaign, it was widely 
anticipated that the SNP would improve on its performance in 2005 and that a British-
wide Conservative revival would pay dividends in Scotland.  Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats were anticipated to be the main defenders.   
The Scotland-wide pattern was evident in individual constituencies, with Labour’s 
vote share up in 44 seats, the SNP’s in 46, the Conservatives in 43, and Liberal 
Democrats in only nine seats.  Under the surface, however, there were some intriguing 
results and a different pattern is evident in target seats.  The general tendency was that the 
incumbent party improved its position regardless of which party was challenging, with 
the exception of the Liberal Democrats who did less well in all but three seats where they 
were incumbents though, crucially, two of the three were their most marginal seats.  In 
large measure this is explained by the party’s general decline, with its best chance of 
holding onto its share of the vote found in seats in which it was incumbent.  David 
Mundell, the sole Tory incumbent, saw his majority increase.  The SNP majority 
decreased in two of its six seats, the neighbouring seats of Moray and Banff & Buchan, 
the latter the seat vacated by Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond, where the 
Conservative candidate was a local television celebrity.  Banff & Buchan remains fairly 
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solid SNP territory, but there was a swing to the Conservatives of 10.7%.  But in each of 
its other four seats, the SNP increased its share of the vote. 
 
In Table 7, we have classified seats according to the swing required to win or 
lose.  In some cases, the party that is in third place may be better placed to win than one 
in second place if, for example, there is evidence of a national swing in favour of the 
third party while the party in second place is falling back.  The top row indicates the 
average swing achieved in seats by each of the parties where less than 5% was required to 
win following the 2005 result.  There was one seat, Ochil and South Perthshire, in which 
the SNP was challenging Labour and vulnerable to under a 5% swing following 2005.  In 
that seat, there was a swing of 4.4% to Labour.  There was also only one seat, Dundee 
East, in which the SNP was incumbent and vulnerable to a swing of under 5% following 
2005.  In 2010, there was a swing to the SNP of 1.8%.  The picture that emerges is of 
incumbents fighting off challenges and generally improving their position across the 
board.    One consequence is that the Conservatives have an even greater challenge to win 
more seats than after 2005.  After that election, two of the top 50 Conservative targets 
were in Scotland, requiring swings of 1.7% and 2.1%, but after 2010 the Conservatives 
best prospect in Scotland is number 60, requiring a swing of 3.8 % 
 
7: Incumbents and challengers 2005-2010 
 Party challenging/incumbent (N) and change in swing 
2005-2010 
Challenger/Incumbent 
Swing required to 
win/lose % following 
2005 
 
Labour (N) 
 
SNP (N) 
 
LibDem (N) 
 
Cons (N) 
Challenger 
0-4.99 
 
-1.74 (4) 
 
-4.4 (1) 
 
-0.5 (3) 
 
-2.8 (4) 
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Challenger 
5-9.99 
 
-1.95 (5) 
 
-3 (2) 
 
-4.1 (12) 
 
-0.4 (10) 
Challenger 
10-19.99% 
 
3.4 (8) 
 
0 (39) 
 
-3.5 (26) 
 
0.2 (25) 
Challenger 
20+ 
 
3.1 (1) 
 
1.5 (11) 
 
3.1 (7) 
 
-1 (19) 
Incumbent 
0-4.99 
 
2.1 (5) 
 
1.8 (1) 
 
1.3 (2) 
 
2.6 (1) 
Incumbent 
5-9.99 
 
2.8 (10) 
 
1.5 (4) 
 
-2.8 (3) 
 
(0) 
Incumbent 
10-19.99 
 
1.3 (20) 
 
-10.7 (1) 
 
-4.2 (5) 
 
(0) 
Incumbent 
20+ 
 
-0.5 (6) 
 
(0) 
 
-4.2 (5) 
 
(0) 
N (59) (59) (59) (59) 
 
 
There is no obvious reason why this should have happened in Scotland.  One 
possible explanation is that tactical voting generally favoured incumbency rather than 
favoured or undermined any particular party.  It is, however, unclear why that should be 
the case unless the incumbent was a particularly well known and appealing figure.  
However, in some cases, the incumbent candidate stood down and it was the incumbent 
party that was the beneficiary.  In Edinburgh South, Labour held the seat with a new 
candidate against a strong challenge from the Liberal Democrats.  The former Labour MP 
stood down following revelations about his private life.  It would appear that replacing 
candidates who might have damaged the party’s performance, due to personal 
peccadilloes or embarrassing expense claims, proved a successful strategy.  
 
Implications of the result for Government 
 The coalition has given the governing parties one more Scottish MP than the 
Conservatives had in 1992 when they last won an election (though 20% of seats rather 
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than 15% due to fewer Scottish seats than 18 years before).  Although there is nothing 
unconstitutional in the Conservatives governing with only one Scottish seat, issues of 
legitimacy undermined Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s and may well have returned 
had they attempted to govern without Liberal Democrat support.15  The Conservatives 
were committed to keeping the Scotland Office while the Liberal Democrats wanted it 
scrapped.  Both were committed to the implementation of the Calman Report and David 
Cameron had emphasised his ‘respect agenda’ by which he meant that Conservative 
Government would respect the devolved institutions.  The Agreement reached between 
the coalition partners and issued five days after the election included a commitment to 
implement Calman.  Danny Alexander, Scottish Liberal Democrat MP and chief of staff 
to Nick Clegg, became Secretary of state for Scotland.  Alexander became Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury following David Laws resignation and was replaced in his 
briefly-held job by Michael Moore, another Liberal Democrat MP.  The Tories’ sole 
Scottish MP became Under Secretary of State, having served as Shadow Scottish 
Secretary.  The Liberal Democrats appeared to offer the Conservatives cover in 
governing Scotland. 
 
As Margaret Thatcher hinted, the Conservative problem in Scotland was less to 
do with policies than with image.  Governing with little support in Scotland created 
problems.  Throughout the campaign and since David Cameron was elected leader, the 
Conservatives went to considerable lengths to convince voters that a Conservative 
Government would be sensitive to Scottish distinctiveness.  Being in government affords 
the Conservatives an opportunity to demonstrate that they are sensitive to Scottish needs 
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and aspirations, but the context of a major fiscal crisis and the need for cuts presents 
challenges, especially for a party about whom the electorate has deep suspicions.  
Coalition may limit accusations that they govern without a Scottish mandate, but also 
means that credit for popular policies will have to be shared with or may simply be 
accredited to the Liberal Democrats. 
 
Implications of the result for 2011 
After the SNP’s victory in 2007, that party’s hierarchy misread its increase in 
support as evidence that it would make a significant breakthrough at the UK general 
election.  This misreading had been encouraged by the result of the Glasgow East by-
election two months after the Holyrood elections in 2007, when the SNP vote rose by 
26% and gave the Nationalists their first by-election victory at Westminster in over a 
decade.  However, the Glenrothes by-election in November 2008 was a major setback for 
the SNP.  In a seat that the SNP had high hopes of winning, having won the nearest 
equivalent seat in Holyrood eighteen months before, the result was a major fillip for 
Gordon Brown, whose own seat lay adjacent to Glenrothes.  In November 2009, Labour 
easily held another by-election, in Glasgow North East, after Michael Martin, former 
Labour MP and Speaker of the House of Commons, resigned.  The Labour candidate won 
59% of the vote and the SNP managed to win only 20 per cent, increasing its share of the 
vote by only 2.3 per cent.  The SNP continued to do well in polls of Holyrood voting 
intentions but it was struggling to have an equivalent impact on Westminster voting 
intentions. 
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However, until a few months before the 2010 election, polls suggested that the 
SNP would increase its share of the vote significantly, if struggle to translate this into 
seats given how far behind it was in 2005.  But the polls and profile of the SNP 
Government in Edinburgh contributed to a sense that the Nationalists would advance.  
The SNP failed to take account of accumulating evidence that the Scottish electorate 
distinguishes its electoral preferences in Holyrood and Westminster elections.  Following 
the 2010 election, Labour may be tempted to make the same mistake and assume that its 
success in a Westminster election will translate into easy success in the Holyrood 
elections in 2011. 
During the course of the election, some pollsters not only asked Scottish electors 
how they would vote on May 6th pending but also how they would vote in a Holyrood 
election.  The context in which the polling took place seems likely to favour Labour over 
the SNP.  Nonetheless, the SNP could take comfort from the Holyrood preferences 
expressed in these polls.  Labour’s 20 point lead over the SNP almost disappeared in both 
constituency and list voting intentions.  A YouGov poll that showed Labour having a 
fifteen point lead over the SNP a few days before election day found the SNP three points 
ahead of Labour in constituency preferences for Holyrood and Labour one point ahead of 
the SNP in the Holyrood regional vote.16  Other polls taken during the election showed 
similar results. 
While there is evidence that voters distinguish between Westminster and 
Holyrood elections, the outcome of Westminster elections is likely to have a greater 
impact on Holyrood elections more than vice versa.  The UK election result means that 
Labour are able to contest next year’s Scottish elections as an unambiguous opposition 
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party, without having to defend a record of public spending cuts that would have been 
near inevitable had Labour won the UK election.  Labour’s task of linking the SNP in 
government in Holyrood with the Conservatives (and Liberal Democrats) in government 
in London is made easier simply because each of Labour’s opponents are in government 
and having to make unpopular decisions.  Scottish Labour has also had a major morale 
boost and while the party lost the election in 2010 across Britain, it performed better than 
many commentators had expected across Britain and it did very well in Scotland.  
Consequently, it is less likely to suffer from the insularity that often comes with defeat. 
 
Conclusion 
 The 2010 election was remarkable in Scotland in that no seats changed hands 
while the Conservatives gained 90 seats in England and five in Wales.  Labour’s position 
strengthened.  This was a remarkable result.  Part of the explanation lies in the enduring 
unpopularity of the Conservatives in Scotland.  Voters may well have supported Labour 
so strongly as a consequence that the real prospect of a Conservative Government.  The 
SNP looked less relevant in a contest that was more focused on the main Westminster 
parties than in recent years.  The paradox of a more distinctively Scottish result following 
a more uniformly British campaign might therefore be explained but the hostility to the 
Conservatives north of the border.  
 
The four party system at Holyrood looks more like a one and three parts party system at 
Westminster.  Scottish Labour is in the enviable position of having no clear challenger at 
Westminster.  Despite a poor election, the Liberal Democrats held onto all their seats and 
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remain challengers in a few key marginals.  The Conservatives remain the outsiders – 
fourth in terms of share of the vote and number of seats.  The key difference from 
previous occasions when a Conservative Prime Minister has been in power is that there is 
a coalition in government at Westminster and the key Scottish Ministerial office is held 
by a Liberal Democrat.  Other differences are the existence of a Scottish Parliament and 
the difficult economic and fiscal context.  However, the real test of David Cameron’s 
premiership from a Scottish perspective is what his respect agenda amounts to in practice 
and how it is perceived north of the border.  Cameron returned his party to the centre 
ground across Britain, detoxifying the brand.  A more deep rooted toxic brand of 
Conservatism in Scotland remains.  The Prime Minister’s challenge lies in altering that 
brand in the more challenging context of government.  
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